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I. INTRODUCTION
LB 518 represents the most recent proposal to amend Nebraska
law governing disposition of individuals acquitted of crimes by reason
of insanity. The bill proposes to change the kind of evidence relevant
to evaluating the dangerousness of an insanity acquittee. Addition-
ally, the bill provides courts with authority to order a variety of treat-
ment programs.
This Note examines the provisions of LB 518 in light of issues en-
compassed by the growing body of scholarship known as therapeutic
jurisprudence. First, the Note introduces the background, procedural
history, and substantive provisions of LB 518. Second, the Note ana-
lyzes the bill's provisions from a therapeutic jurisprudential perspec-
tive. Specifically, the Note focuses on promotion of psychological
dysfunction, promotion of therapeutic objectives, therapeutic aspects
of legal procedures, and therapeutic aspects of judicial actions. The
Note concludes that LB 518 has great potential to promote therapeutic
objectives, limited only by judicial application of the bill's provisions.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Nebraska Law
When a defendant is acquitted of a crime on the basis of insanity in
Nebraska, state law requires inquiry into the acquittee's present
mental condition and probable future dangerousness before the court
can commit the acquittee to a treatment facility.1 The state must
show that there is probable cause to believe that the acquittee is dan-
gerous or will be in the foreseeable future "by reason of mental illness
or defect."2 To establish probable cause, the prosecutor must offer ev-
idence of overt acts or threats by the acquittee which are indicative of
dangerousness.3 If the court finds that probable cause exists, the ac-
quittee is committed to a treatment facility for 90 days to permit fur-
ther evaluation and preparation of a treatment plan.4 During the 90
day commitment, the evaluation must once again focus on dangerous-
ness as evinced by overt acts or threats.5 The acquittee's release from
confinement is contingent on the findings at a hearing conducted
before the expiration of 90 days.6 If the court determines that the in-
dividual's overt acts or threats provide clear and convincing evidence
of present or future dangerousness caused by mental illness, the court
1. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3701(1)(1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3701(3).
6. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3702(1992).
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can order commitment to an appropriate treatment facility.7 Absent
such clear and convincing evidence, Nebraska law requires the court
to unconditionally release the person from confinement.8 If the court
orders commitment for treatment, the acquittee's mental condition
will be reviewed annually and at any other time on a motion made by
the court, the acquittee or the prosecutor. 9 When the individual is no
longer dangerous as a result of mental illness or defect, current state
law requires the court to unconditionally release the acquittee.0 Re-
lease must occur regardless of the reason for lack of dangerousness.11
B. Modern Approach
In contrast to the Nebraska scheme, a modem approach to the dis-
position of insanity acquittees entails a structured process through
which acquitted individuals are exposed to progressively greater com-
munity contact. Modern "graduated release" programs facilitate rein-
tegration of acquittees into the community while minimizing safety
risks to society.1 2 LB 518 entails a progressive scheme which would
vest courts with the authority to specify conditions of liberty for in-
sanity acquittees consistent with appropriate treatment goals and pub-
lic safety concerns.
C. LB 704
LB 70413 was the predecessor to LB 518. The 1991 bill was designed
to give courts greater latitude in placing insanity acquittees in appro-
priate treatment programs when their mental conditions rendered
them dangerous.14 LB 704 proposed to amend only the section of the
Nebraska statute pertaining to confinement of the individual after a
determination of dangerousness at annual or court/party initiated re-
7. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3702.
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3703(2)(1992).
9. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3703(1).
10. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3703(2).
11. The statute does not distinguish between individuals who are no longer danger-
ous due to remission of mental illness and individuals who are no longer danger-
ous due to stabilization through medication:
If as a result of such hearing the court finds that such person is no longer
dangerous to himself, herself, or others by reason of mental illness or
defect, and will not be so dangerous in the foreseeable future, the court
shall order such person unconditionally released from further
confinement.
Id.
12. Final Report of the National Institute of Mental Health Ad Hoc Forensic Advi-
sory Panel, 12 MENTAL AND PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 77, 87-89 (1988)[Herein-
after Final Report].
13. LB 704, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. (1991).
14. Id.
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view.15 Although the bill was advanced from the Health and Human
Services Committee to General File,16 it was never enacted into law.
LB 704 addressed the lack of a "graduated release" process in Ne-
braska law by providing courts with authority to place acquittees in
treatment programs of various levels of restrictiveness. However, the
bill did not address the problem presented by an acquittee whose overt
behavior does not provide either probable cause or clear and convinc-
ing evidence17 of current or future dangerousness. Furthermore, LB
704 did not address the situation in which an acquittee's lack of dan-
gerousness is due to the fact that medication has stabilized his or her
condition.
III. LB 518
A. Procedural History
LB 51818 was introduced to the Judiciary Committee by Senator
Don Wesely19 to the Judiciary Committee on January 19, 1993. The
bill amends sections of the Nebraska statutes pertaining to the disposi-
tion of individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity.20 The Judi-
ciary Committee has not yet advanced LB 518 to General File, but
Senator Dennis Baack, the Speaker of the Legislature, has placed the
bill on priority status.2 1 LB 518 was drafted by individuals of diverse
15. LB 704 was a proposed amendment to NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3703(2). Specifically,
the amendment provided that a finding of current or future dangerousness at an
annual or court/party initiated review required the court to:
[O]rder such person placed in an appropriate treatment program under
an appropriate treatment plan and conditions consistent with the safety
of the public. The treatment program may be any public or private facil-
ity or program which offers treatment for mental illness and may in-
dude an inpatient, residential, day, or outpatient setting.
Id.
16. In the Nebraska Legislature, a bill is first reviewed in the committee of its origi-
nation. If the committee approves it, the bill is then advanced to the General
File, the first stage of debate and amendment before the entire legislature. If the
bill is approved in General File, it advances to Select File, the second stage of
debate and amendment before the entire legislature. Finally, a bill approved in
Select File must pass Final Reading, which is the last voting stage in the history
of the bill.
17. Probable cause is required for commitment of the acquittee for the 90 day evalua-
tion period. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3701(1)(1992). Clear and convincing evidence is
required for confinement of the individual beyond 90 days. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
3702(2). LB 704 did not allow a court to consider an acquittee's omissions in eval-
uating his or her dangerousness.
18. LB 518, 93rd Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
19. Senator Wesely represents Nebraska's 26th district. He was chairperson of the
Health and Human Services Committee when it introduced LB 704 on January
19, 1991.
20. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3701 to 3703.
21. Priority bills are placed at the top of the legislative agenda and generally have a
greater chance of approval. Each senator in the Nebraska Unicameral chooses
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backgrounds, and it addresses concerns relevant to their particular ar-
eas of expertise.22
B. Substantive Provisions
LB 518 proposes to change the kind of evidence relevant to a prob-
able cause determination that an insanity acquittee is or will be dan-
gerous and should be committed for treatment.23 LB 518 allows the
state to offer evidence of the acquittee's "omissions," in addition to his
or her threats or overt acts, to establish dangerousness.24 The bill re-
quires the court to consider "all evidence adduced at trial and all addi-
tional relevant evidence."25 Evidence of "omissions" is included to
account for situations in which dangerousness is due to failure to fol-
low a prescribed treatment plan.26
After a court finds probable cause that the acquittee is or will be a
danger to self or others, LB 518 imposes some requirements on the
process of evaluation and formulation of a treatment plan.27 Specifi-
cally, the bill requires the evaluation to address:
(a) the person's psychological condition at the time of the evaluation;
(b) the probable course of development of the person's condition, with special
attention to the probable relationship between the person's current condition
and the person's condition at the time of any omissions, threats, or overt acts
establishing dangerousness, including the crime for which he or she was ac-
quitted on ground of insanity;
(c) the probable relationship, if any, between the previous omissions, threats,
or overt acts establishing dangerousness and the person's condition at the time
of the omissions, threats, or overt acts; and
one priority bill per session. The Speaker selects an additional twenty five bills,
and LB 518 was among those chosen by the Speaker during the Spring 1993
session.
22. LB 518 was drafted by Lancaster County Attorney Gary Lacey and Professors
Robert F. Schopp and Karen Knight of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Col-
lege of Law. Professor Schopp's legal expertise is supplemented by doctoral de-
grees in Clinical Psychology and in Philosophy. Professor Knight-Eagan is an
instructor of Criminal Law and Director of the Criminal Clinic program at the
College of Law. Statement of Senator Wesely, Hearing on LB 518 Before the Ju-
diciarj Committee, 93rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 18, 1993)[Hereinafter Hearing].
Gary Lacey recently prosecuted a well-publicized first degree assault case in
which the defendant successfully invoked the insanity defense. See, State of Ne-
braska v. Andrew Scott Baldwin, Lancaster County District Court Doc. 682, p. 1 6 4
(1992). The defendant was acquitted, and when his condition was stabilized
through the use of medication, he was released. Nebraska law did not permit the
court to consider the fact that stabilization of the acquittee's condition was depen-
dent on medication. The statute required the court to unconditionally release the
acquittee from court ordered treatment in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence of present or future dangerousness relating to mental illness.
23. See LB 518 § 1.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Hearing, supra note 22, at 4 (Statement of Senator Wesely).
27. LB 518 § 1(3).
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(d) the prognosis for change in the person's condition in light of available
treatment.
2 8
LB 518 is designed to change the kind of evidence that the court
must consider in determining whether there is clear and convincing
evidence of dangerousness which merits court-ordered treatment.29
The bill requires the court to focus on the results of the evaluation,
evidence from the trial, omissions, threats or overt acts indicative of
dangerousness, and other relevant evidence in its assessment of dan-
gerousness. 30 Additionally, the court must consider whether the per-
son will be dangerous in the future "absent continuing participation in
appropriate treatment."3 '
If clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness does not exist,
the court must unconditionally release the person from court-ordered
treatment.32 If clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness exists,
the bill directs the court to order the least restrictive available treat-
ment program consistent with the needs of the person and public
safety.33 LB 518 allows a court to consider inpatient, residential, day,
and outpatient settings in choosing the most appropriate treatment
regime. 34
LB 518 provides for annual review of the mental condition of a per-
son confined after acquittal. 35 Review may take place at other times
pursuant to motions of the court, the acquittee or the prosecutor.3 6
When the court finds that the person's mental condition no longer
poses a danger to the acquittee or others and will not in the future
"irrespective of participation in ongoing treatment," LB 518 requires
the court to unconditionally release the individual from court-ordered
treatment.37 If the court determines that the person's mental condi-
tion causes him or her to remain dangerous or presents a likelihood of
future dangerousness, the bill gives the court authority to order a vari-
ety of treatment alternatives.38 In choosing a treatment regime, the
court is required to "place the person in the least restrictive available
treatment program that is consistent with the treatment needs of the
28. Id.
29. LB 518 §§ 2 (1) & (2).
30. LB 518 § 2(1).
31. Id.
32. LB 518 § 2(2).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. LB 518 § 3(1).
36. Id. (providing that the cost of an evaluation conducted pursuant to a motion by
the court or prosecutor will be borne by the county). The county also will bear
the cost of evaluation if the confined individual is indigent. Hearing, supra note
22, at 12 (Statement of Lancaster County Attorney Gary Lacey).
37. LB 518 § 3(2).
38. Id.
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person and the safety of the public."39
LB 518 enables the court to monitor compliance with any treat-
ment plan through the use of hearings held annually and on motions
of the court or prosecuting attorney.40 If there is probable cause to
believe that an acquittee is not complying with court-ordered treat-
ment, the bill gives the court authority to issue an arrest warrant.41
The court can order confinement of the individual in a mental health
facility until a hearing is held to determine whether the existing treat-
ment program should be continued, terminated, or modified.42
The final section of LB 518 provides for documentation of pro-
grams to which individuals are committed on the effective date of LB
518.43 It also requires notification of the prosecuting attorney when
the individual fails to comply with treatment.44
IV. ANALYSIS
The study of the therapeutic and antitherapeutic aspects of laws,
legal procedures, and the roles of actors within the legal system is re-
ferred to as "therapeutic jurisprudence."45 This growing body of
scholarship encompasses four primary areas of inquiry:46 1) promo-
tion of psychological dysfunction through the law; 2) promotion of
therapeutic objectives through the law; 3) therapeutic aspects of legal
procedures; and 4) therapeutic aspects of legal roles. Each subcategory
is applicable to LB 518 and reveals valuable information concerning
the bill's utility in achieving therapeutic objectives.
A. Promoting Psychological Dysfunction
The law as an institution can contribute to psychological disfunc-
tion in a variety of ways. 47 Certain aspects of mental health laws cre-
ate disincentives that discourage individuals from seeking or obtaining
needed treatment. Other aspects of the law encourage unnecessary
39. Id.
40. LB 518 § 3(4).
41. Id.
42. Id. The hearing must be held within ten days after the individual is taken into
custody. Id.
43. LB 518 § 3(5).
44. Id.
45. DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER &
BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE xi (1991).
46. WEXLER, supra note 45, at 4; WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 45, at 20; David B.
Wexler & Robert F. Schopp, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A New Approach to
Mental Health Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 361, 362 (Doro-
thy K. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992).
47. See WEXLER, supra note 45, at 5; WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 45, at 20; Wexler
& Schopp, supra note 46, at 363.
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treatment. Finally, mental health laws can induce negative self-
perceptions.
1. Discouraging Needed Treatment
Laws relating to the insanity defense discourage people from seek-
ing needed treatment by failing to impose limits on the length of con-
finement for treatment. In Jones v. United States,48 the Supreme
Court rejected a constitutional attack on the Government's power to
confine an insanity acquittee until the individual has regained sanity
or is no longer a danger to self or others. The Court asserted that the
purpose of insanity acquittal is to enable the individual to receive
treatment and to minimize the danger he poses to himself and to soci-
ety. Thus, a court can order confinement for a potentially indefinite
time,49 limited only by the acquittee's recovery or the disappearance of
his dangerousness. The dissent in Jones recognized that there are as-
pects of commitment in a mental health facility which make it more
intrusive than incarceration.5 0 Consequently, an individual in need of
treatment may fail to assert the insanity defense because a criminal
sentence would be of definite and frequently shorter duration5l and
may be less intrusive. When an individual in need of treatment fails to
assert the defense, his or her condition often remains untreated, and
the legal system has essentially promoted further psychological
dysfunction.
Some jurisdictions limit the period of confinement for treatment to
the maximum period of incarceration for the offense charged.52 While
this approach may make the insanity defense more appealing to crimi-
48. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
49. Id. at 386 (Justice Brennan, dissenting). "There simply is no necessary correla-
tion between the severity of the offense and length of time necessary for recov-
ery. The length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is
irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment." Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 369 (1983).
50. The dissent referred to restrictions on associations, locks, guards, regulation of
daily activities, and loss of right to withhold consent to medical treatment. Id. at
384-85 (Justice Brennan, dissenting).
51. Researchers have concluded that insanity acquittees spend significantly longer
time in confinement than defendants convicted of the same serious crimes with
which the acquittees were charged. Henry J. Steadman, Empirical Research on
the Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 58 (1985).
52. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(d)(1992)("A defendant ... shall be held in custody for a
period of time not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime
for which the defendant was acquitted . .. or until the mental illness is cured
.. ); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-582(e)(1)(A)(1992)("[T]he court shall fix a maxi-
mum term of commitment, not to exceed the maximum sentence that could have
been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense .... ); FLA. STAT.
ch. 916.13 (1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3430 (1991); LA. CODE Juv. PROC. ANN.
Art. 837 (1992)(pertaining to the commitment of juveniles); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
730 para. 5/5-2-4(b)(1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.341(1)(1991); TEX. CODE CRIM.
[Vol. 72:837
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nal defendants in need of treatment, it can contribute to psychological
dysfunction, as well. As the Court in Jones noted, the considerations
underlying length of commitment for treatment differ from the con-
siderations underlying length of incarceration.53 There is no relation
between the length of time necessary for adequate treatment and the
length of incarceration deemed an appropriate punishment for viola-
tion of a criminal law. Thus, limitations on commitment which are
based on maximum sentences may hinder treatment objectives by
mandating premature treatment termination. Additionally, tying the
commitment period to the length of the criminal sentence suggests
that the commitment is intended to be punitive rather than therapeu-
tic. A belief that commitment is punitive can retard the treatment
process. 54 To the extent that time limitations on commitment detract
from treatment, they contribute to psychological dysfunction rather
than minimize it.
LB 518 does not limit the period of commitment for treatment to
the maximum criminal sentence available for the crime charged. In-
stead, the bill requires a court to release the acquittee from court-or-
dered treatment when the court no longer finds clear and convincing
evidence that the mental illness does currently, or will in the future,
make the individual dangerous.5 5 This lack of definitive limitation on
period of confinement may promote psychological dysfunction by dis-
couraging people in need of treatment from asserting the insanity de-
fense.5 6 However, a recent Supreme Court decision restricts the
ability of courts to confine insanity acquittees who are no longer men-
tally ill but remain dangerous.57
In Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court struck down a Louisiana statute
which allowed continued confinement of an insanity acquittee who
was no longer mentally ill but remained dangerous.SS The Court as-
serted that confinement of an acquittee after the individual is no
longer psychologically impaired within the legal definition of mental
illness presents three problems. First, unless the criteria for civil com-
mitment are satisfied, there is no authority for confinement of the ac-
quittee after evidence of mental illness has disappeared.59 Second, the
PROC. ANN. Art. 46.01 et seq. (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-302(3)(1992); ABA
CRIM. JUST. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDs 7-7.7(A)(1989).
53. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
54. One author discusses an insanity acquittee's view that he had "done enough time"
as an inpatient and how that view enabled him to avoid taking responsibility for
his crime. Robert A. Fein, How the Insanity Acquittal Retards Treatment, 8 L. &
HuMi. BEHAV. 283, 288 (1984)(case of A.L.).
55. LB 518 § 2(2).
56. See supra notes 51 - 52 and accompanying text.
57. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1784.
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acquittee is constitutionally entitled to civil commitment procedures
when his confinement can no longer be premised on insanity acquit-
tal.60 Third, the Due Process Clause bars arbitrary government ac-
tions, and confinement of an acquittee in the absence of mental illness
is such an action. 61 Thus, Foucha restricts the ability of a court to
confine an acquittee who is no longer mentally ill but is still danger-
ous. LB 518 incorporates the Foucha standard by requiring a court to
evaluate dangerousness only as it is precipitated by "mental illness or
defect."62 This limiting language will likely remove some of the disin-
centives63 associated with asserting the insanity defense.
The Foucha standard is reflected in other language of LB 518 as
well. The language appears in the portion of the bill pertaining to
mental status hearings conducted after court-ordered treatment has
been prescribed for the acquittee. 64 Specifically, the bill requires un-
conditional release from court-ordered treatment if the acquittee is no
longer dangerous "by reason of mental illness or defect" and will not
be dangerous in the future "irrespective of participation in ongoing
treatment."65 This language requires that mental illness accompany
dangerousness to justify court control over an insanity acquittee. Ad-
ditionally, the drafters of the bill intended the phrase "irrespective of
ongoing treatment" to convey the idea that absence of mental illness
must not be due to participation in treatment.66 Mental illness can be
stabilized through treatment to the extent that an individual's condi-
tion no longer fits the legal definition of mental illness or defect.67
Because of this fact, a court's consideration of the effects of treatment
in deciding whether to release an insanity acquittee might make it
more difficult for the acquittee to ever be free from court-ordered
care. Additionally, allowing a court to consider whether mental well-
being is contingent on continued participation in treatment in deciding
whether to release an acquittee may be repugnant to the holding in
Foucha.
In Foucha, the Court ordered release of an insanity acquittee
whose psychological impairment (an untreatable personality disorder)
60. Id. at 1785.
61. Id.
62. LB 518 §§ 1(1) & 2(1).
63. See Steadman, supra note 51.
64. LB 518 § 3(2).
65. Id.
66. Hearing, supra note 22, at 23-24 (statement of Senator Wesely)("[T]he language
... is to indicate that an individual is not found... mentally ill or dangerous,
whether or not he's in a treatment program. That means he doesn't need treat-
ment.... Then if... not being mentally ill or dangerous depends upon... being
part of a treatment program, then you get into the conditions and the qualifica-
tions that we talked about.") Id.
67. See supra note 22 (discussing Lancaster County District Court case Doc. 682, p.
164 (1992)).
[Vol. 72:837
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did not fit the legal definition of mental illness, although it did render
him dangerous. 68 The Court held that, except in certain narrow cir-
cumstances, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that
an acquittee is both mentally ill and dangerous before court control
over the individual is justified.69 The question remains whether an
insanity acquittee, whose use of medication controls his dangerousness
as long as he continues to use it, can be subjected to court control con-
sistent with the holding in Foucha.70 Although the majority in Foucha
did not directly address this question, a thoughtful concurrence by
Justice O'Connor provides some insight.
Justice O'Connor did not interpret the majority's holding as com-
pletely negating state authority to confine dangerous insanity acquit-
tees after they have regained mental health.71 She relied on an
earlier Supreme Court case to support the proposition that courts
should defer to reasonable legislative judgments about mental illness
and dangerousness.72 Under this principle, she asserted that a state
might retain authority to confine an insanity acquittee who has
regained sanity if the nature and duration of confinement "were tai-
lored to reflect pressing public safety concerns" related to the danger-
ousness of the acquittee.7 3 She added that states must have medical
justification for confining insanity acquittees.7 4
An application of Justice O'Connor's reasoning to LB 518 leads to
the conclusion that the bill is consistent with the majority's holding in
Foucha. LB 518 permits a court to consider an acquittee's participa-
tion in treatment in determining whether the individual remains men-
tally ill and dangerous.75 If lack of illness or dangerousness is due to
participation in treatment, the bill allows the state to require the ac-
quittee to participate in "appropriate treatment." 76 Consistent with
the holding in Foucha, the bill requires that the treatment be "the
least restrictive available treatment program that is consistent with
the treatment needs of the person and the safety of the public."77 LB
518 directs court-ordered restrictions on liberty to be tailored to re-
flect public safety concerns related to the acquittee's dangerousness.
68. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
69. Id. at 1786.
70. The ultimate question is whether an acquittee, who no longer fits the legal defini-
tion of mentally ill as a result of ongoing treatment, is no longer ill or is chroni-
cally in a controlled state. This is a general question that permeates many aspects
of mental health law.
71. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1789 (1992) (Justice O'Connor, concurring).
72. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983).
73. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1789 (1992) (Justice O'Connor, concurring).
74. Id. at 1789-90.
75. LB 518 §§ 2(1) & 3(2).
76. LB 518 §§ 2(2) & 3(2).
77. Id.
1993]
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Thus, LB 518 is consistent with Justice O'Connor's interpretation of
the majority opinion in Foucha.
The language of the majority in Foucha is consonant with this in-
terpretation. The majority noted that there are "certain narrow cir-
cumstances" in which state control over dangerous individuals who
have not been convicted of crimes is constitutionally permissible.78
The Court emphasized that the state control must be "narrowly fo-
cused on a particularly acute problem in which the government inter-
ests are overwhelming."79 State control sanctioned by LB 518 appears
to fit this description. The bill requires a court to consider whether an
insanity acquittee is or will be dangerous "irrespective of participation
in ongoing treatment."8 0 In the event that lack of dangerousness is
dependent on an acquittee's compliance with a treatment regime, the
bill vests the court with authority to make participation in treatment
mandatory. The bill requires the court to conclude that the acquittee
remains dangerous as a result of mental illness before the court can
mandate participation in treatment. If absence of dangerousness is de-
pendent on an acquittee's continued compliance with treatment, the
bill requires the court to order the "least restrictive available treat-
ment."8 1 Thus, it seems that LB 518 meets the requirement articu-
lated in Foucha that state control be narrowly focused on an acute
problem in which government interest is compelling.
2. Encouraging Unnecessary Treatment
A second way in which laws relating to the insanity defense pro-
mote psychological dysfunction is by encouraging unnecessary treat-
ment. Modern legal approaches to insanity, like LB 518, give courts
authority to order outpatient and daytime treatment programs. This
expansion of authority enables courts to exercise control over individ-
uals in their community lives and may encourage unnecessary treat-
ment. Libertarian objections to vesting courts with the authority to
order outpatient treatment are premised on the assertion that such
authority represents a pervasive form of social control, arguably more
intrusive than hospitalization.8 2 Because legislators generally view
court-ordered outpatient treatment as less intrusive than compulsory
hospitalization, many states do not provide outpatients with the proce-
dural protections traditionally afforded to individuals subject to gov-
78. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786 (referring to United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739 (1987) in which the Court held that limited pretrial detention of
arrestees charged with serious crimes was constitutional).
79. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786.
80. LB 518 § 3(2).
81. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786.
82. Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment: The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11 ABA
MENTAL & PHYs. DISABILITY L. REP. 288 (1987).
[Vol. 72:837
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ernment control.83 Outpatients generally do not have a right to refuse
court-ordered medication.84 Critics of legislation that allocates broad
authority to courts in ordering treatment argue that it allows judges to
order outpatient treatment for individuals who do not need legal con-
trols to ensure that they participate in treatment.8 5 Additionally, it
may enable judges to order outpatient treatment for individuals in-
stead of releasing them when they are not "ill" enough to commit to a
treatment facility. Thus, outpatient treatment may encourage unnec-
essary treatment.
LB 518 increases the ability of the court to control the community
lives of potentially dangerous individuals; however, it is not likely that
the bill will encourage unnecessary treatment. Protections against the
ordering of treatment for individuals who are not "ill" enough to com-
mit to a treatment facility inhere in the bill. LB 518 allows the court
to order treatment only when there is clear and convincing evidence
of dangerousness caused by mental illness.86 Absent such evidence,
the bill requires the court to unconditionally release the individual
from court control.8 7 If judges in fact apply the clear and convincing
standard under LB 518 as they do under existing Nebraska law,8 8 the
only situation in which the bill may result in more court-ordered
treatment is when mental stability is due to medication. Studies sug-
gest that the tenuous nature of medically induced stability warrants
such intrusion.8 9
Forced medication can have therapeutic effects when the illness
itself is responsible for a patient's refusal of medication.9 0 Schwartz
and his colleagues studied psychiatric inpatients with a wide variety of
diagnoses who had been involuntarily treated with antipsychotic med-
ication at least once. The researchers found that 68% of the patients
83. JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF
MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND PolicY IN THE UNITED STATES 121-22 (1992).
84. Alexander D. Brooks, Outpatient Commitment for the Chronically Mentally Ill:
Law and Policy, in IMPROVING MENTAL HEALTH SERvICES: WHAT THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES CAN TELL Us 117 (David Mechanic ed., 1987).
85. Edward P. Mulvey et al., The Promise and Peril of Involuntary Outpatient Com-
mitment, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 571 (1987).
86. LB 518 § 2(2).
87. Id.
88. There is no evidence to suggest that courts will order outpatient therapy for those
individuals they would have released under current Nebraska law. However,
given the general belief that outpatient care is less intrusive (see LAFOND & DUR-
HAM, supra note 83 at 121-22), it would be interesting to compare judges' applica-
tion of the clear and convincing standard under current law to its application
under LB 518 if the bill is enacted.
89. See Harold Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Pa-
tients' Attitudes after Involuntary Medication, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
189 (David B. Wexler ed., 1991).
90. IC
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later approved of the decision to involuntarily medicate.91 One third
of the patients in the study attributed their initial refusals to the belief
that they did not need medication.92 Tests of the patients at the time
of their refusals indicated that the patients' denials of illness were of
psychotic proportion.93 The researchers concluded that a majority of
the treatment refusals were influenced by erosion of judgment due to
psychosis. 94
Although the study by Schwartz and his colleagues examined inpa-
tients whose illnesses warranted involuntary treatment, the study of-
fers information relevant to the provisions of LB 518. Medication can
be essential to normal functioning when an illness (i.e. psychosis) is
known to erode judgment. When even the decision whether to take
medication is affected by the medication, the individual's stability is
contingent on treatment compliance. Under current Nebraska law,
there are no checks to ensure treatment compliance by an insanity
acquittee who is rendered not dangerous by medication.95 If an acquit-
tee fails to follow his or her treatment regime, the Schwartz study96
suggests that the acquittee may lapse into denial97 and believe that
medication is not necessary.98 LB 518 requires courts to consider
whether acquittees will be dangerous in the future, absent compliance
with treatment, when deciding whether ordered treatment is appro-
priate.99 Additionally, the bill provides courts with latitude in the
type of treatment to order.10 0 Thus, an acquittee whose stability is
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. The researchers used results of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) ob-
tained at the time of medication refusal as a measure of denial. Id. at 190, 196.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 22 (discussing Lancaster County District Court Doc. 682, p. 164
(1992)). When the acquittee's condition was stabilized through the use of medica-
tion, there was no longer clear and convincing evidence of present or future dan-
gerousness relating to mental illness. Nebraska law did not permit the judge to
consider the fact that stabilization was due to medication, and the statute re-
quired the court to unconditionally release the acquittee from court ordered
treatment.
96. Schwartz et al., supra note 89.
97. Id. Schwartz et al. assert that their findings are consistent with other studies of
denial and cite L. H. Roth et al., The Dilemma of Denial in the Assessment of
Competency to Refuse Treatment, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 910 (1982).
98. The recent case prosecuted by Lancaster County Attorney Gary Lacey, supra
note 22, entailed a similar progression of events. After the acquittee was released
from court-ordered treatment, he stopped taking the medication which had stabi-
lized his condition. A second psychotic incident occurred shortly after he stopped
taking medication, and he was severely injured. He later attributed his failure to
continue medication to a belief that he no longer needed it.
99. LB 518 § 2(1).
100. LB 518 § 2(2). In describing alternatives to traditional inpatient care plans, one
pair of authors asserted, "A match of needs and solutions is both good medicine
and good law." LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 83, at 166.
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contingent on continued medication may be ordered to report to a
treatment facility for daily medication or for periodic monitoring of
treatment compliance. Courts have not yet addressed whether
Foucha will prevent them from ordering such behavior after an ac-
quittee's condition has been stabilized through medication.' 0 ' At this
time, Foucha does not appear to proscribe this type of control.
A legitimate concern about LB 518 is that it will enable courts to
order treatment for individuals who do not need legal controls to en-
sure treatment compliance.' 0 2 Only individuals who are potentially
dangerous but capable of complying with treatment without a court
order should be adversely affected by this aspect of the bill. Once
again, if stability is due to medication, court-ordered checks on compli-
ance may be justified. They protect the individual and society against
problems arising from unexpected interruptions in medication while
preserving the individual's right to the least restrictions on liberty fea-
sible. This reasoning is consistent with the view that there must be
two primary restrictions on the use of state coercion on mentally ill
individuals.103 First, state coercion must be used to match individuals
with appropriate and legitimate therapeutic services.'0 4 Second, coer-
cion should be used only to the extent necessary, preserving the most
freedom from constraint practical. 0 5 The provisions of LB 518, if ap-
plied correctly, will not offend these principles. The bill provides the
courts with authority to order a variety of treatment alternatives 0 6
facilitating matching between individuals and treatment programs.
Furthermore, the bill requires the court to consider the treatment
needs of the person and the safety of the public in selecting an appro-
priate treatment setting for the individual.107 Thus, if the provisions
of LB 518 are applied as the drafters intended,108 the bill will facilitate
appropriate treatment rather than encourage unnecessary treatment.
Highly publicized insanity acquittals often elicit proposals for dras-
tic changes in the law from the public and from within the legal sys-
tem.10 9 Previous reactionary proposals for change have contained
101. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
102. See Mulvey et al., supra note 85, at 12.
103. See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 83, at 160.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. LB 518 §§ 2(2) & 3(2).
107. Id.
108. The intent of the bill is that judges continue to apply the concept of "clear and
convincing" evidence in much the same way as they have under exiting law. See
LB 518 statement of purpose; see also Hearing, supra note 22, at 2 (statement of
Senator Wesely). Modification of this standard to include in outpatient treatment
individuals who would be released under existing law is not the intended
application.
109. See THOuAs MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 52-72 (1985)(discussing efforts to change the insanity de-
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myopic logic which did not adequately account for their long-term ef-
fects.11o LB 518 represents a well-reasoned alternative to drastic
changes such as abolishing the insanity defense entirely. Individuals
arguing against increased court control over the process of treat-
mentlll are likely to find themselves in a "Catch 22"112 if the alterna-
tive to increased control is complete abolition of the defense.
Additionally, increased court control over the treatment process
through LB 518 may actually reduce the overall controls over acquit-
ted individuals. This is so because some acquittees eligible for outpa-
tient treatment under LB 518 would be confined to inpatient care
under the existing scheme which offers no treatment alternatives to
commitment.
3. Labeling
Laws relating to acquittal of criminal charges on the basis of in-
sanity promote psychological dysfunction by stigmatizing acquittees.
Critics of the insanity defense argue that it leads to "double" stigmati-
zation, since the individual is stigmatized for criminality and for
mental illness.113 One author asserts that it is clear that prejudice and
discrimination against individuals with mental illness pervade the
legal system.114 He calls for education of judges, legislators, and
policymakers about the malignancy of stereotypes relating to individu-
als with mental illness.115
The ABA criminal Justice Mental Health Standardsl16 encourage
replacement of the term "insanity" with the phrase "mental nonre-
sponsibility" because of the stigma associated with the term "in-
sanity."117 This phrase offers a partial solution and must be coupled
with educational efforts to minimize stereotyping. 118 Absent changes
in perspectives, a similar set of stigmas may become associated with
this phrase, rendering it only a temporary solution to the problem of
stigma.
fense during the wake of the trial of John Hinckley for his assassination attempt
on President Reagan. Efforts ranged from tightening the criteria for the insanity
defense to its complete abolition.) Id. at 147-48; see also LAFOND & DURHAM,
supra note 83, at 58-77 (discussing various positions on the insanity defense after
the Hinckley verdict).
110. THOMAS MAEDER, supra note 109, at 52-72.
111. See Stefan, supra note 82; Mulvey et al., supra note 85.
112. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH 22 (1961).
113. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 219 (1976)(cited
in Fein, supra note 54, at 284).
114. Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanis=," 46 S.M.U. L. REv. 373 (1992)(referring to the
irrational prejudice against mental disability as "sanism").
115. Id.
116. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS (1989).
117. Id. at xx (Introduction, p. 20).
118. See generally Perlin, supra note 114.
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LB 518 does not address the issues of labeling and stigma associated
with insanity acquittal. The ABA's "mental nonresponsibility" phrase
may provide a beneficial addition to the bill. The issue warrants em-
pirical research.
B. Promoting Therapeutic Objectives
Principles of therapy and health care compliance can be invoked to
promote therapeutic objectives in several legal contexts. Studies on
outpatient treatment and graduated release programs reveal the ther-
apeutic benefits of a variety of alternatives to inpatient care. 1 9 Addi-
tionally, the concept of imposing responsibility for certain actions and
inactions of insanity acquittees may promote therapeutic objectives
and warrants empirical study. When laws are promulgated with the
goal of promoting therapeutic objectives, empirical research should
provide their foundation and should be used to evaluate their utility in
attaining the goal.12 0
1. Outpatient Treatment
Outpatient treatment plans are premised on the notion that intru-
sions on the liberty of mentally ill individuals are justified if they help
the individuals to reside successfully in community settings.' 2 ' Laws
prescribing outpatient treatment target mentally ill individuals "who
should not remain in the hospital because they are capable of being
maintained in the community," but who have demonstrated a lack of
ability or desire to comply with treatment.12 2
Studies on the effectiveness of outpatient treatment reveal that it
matches or exceeds the effectiveness of inpatient care, which tends to
be more expensive. 23 Longer hospital stays for psychiatric treatment
are associated with greater dependence and increased likelihood of fu-
ture hospitalization.124 In contrast, outpatient treatment programs
that are longer in duration lead to greater progress. 25 Additionally,
119. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
120. WEXLER & WINICK, supra note 45, at 24.
121. Brooks, supra note 84, at 120.
122. Id. at 121.
123. Les R. Greene & Arnold De La Cruz, Psychiatric Day Treatment as an Alterna-
tive to and Transition from Full-Time Hospitalization, 17 COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH J. 191 (1981); Virginia A. Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North
Carolina Experience with Outpatient Commitment7 A Critical Appraisal, 10
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 215 (1989); Charles A. Kiesler, Public and Professional
Myths about Mental Hospitalization: An Empirical Reassessment of Policy-Re-
lated Beliefs, 37 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 1323 (1982).
124. Jeffrey A. Mattes, The Optimal Length of Hospitalization for Psychiatric Pa-
tients: A Review of the Literature, 33 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 824, 827
(1982).
125. Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, A Search for the Missing Premise of Invol-
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outpatient care is reasonably effective in ensuring compliance with
medication.126 Finally, community facilities and outpatient treatment
arrangements can be far less expensive than inpatient care.'2 7 When
they are available, outpatient treatment plans can be superior to inpa-
tient care in many respects.
Incorporation of these empirically based conclusions into statutory
schemes governing court-ordered psychiatric treatment can facilitate
therapeutic objectives. Such conclusions inhere in the provisions of
LB 518. The range of treatment alternatives which the bill authorizes
a court to order encompasses outpatient plans and other alternatives
to inpatient care.128 In order for the system to reap the benefits of
such treatment plans, courts must utilize them in ordering treatment
for acquittees.129 Judges cannot allow political pressures and public
reactions to insanity acquittals to cause them to view inpatient treat-
ment as the only appropriate treatment. Nor should they modify the
construction of "clear and convincing" evidence of dangerousness as-
sociated with mental illness.1so A construction of the phrase which
would enable a court to order outpatient care for individuals who
would be unconditionally released under existing Nebraska law could
be problematic. Such an interpretation could bring about a new and
unwarranted class of "mentally ill and dangerous" individuals.131
These individuals would interfere with the provision of outpatient
treatment for those truly in need by usurping treatment resources.
Additionally, they may fall prey to the phenomenon of self-fulfilling
prophecy associated with labeling, and psychiatric treatment would
untary Therapeutic Commitment- Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, in
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE supra note 45, at 133, 158.
126. LAFOND & DURHAm, supra note 83, at 166.
127. Id.
128. LB 518 §§ 2(2) & 3(2). "The treatment program may involve any public or private
facility or program which offers treatment for mental illness and may include an
inpatient, residential, day, or outpatient setting."
129. If judges consider regional centers and other inpatient treatment settings the
only "politically acceptable" treatment settings for insanity acquittees, people in
need of treatment may be less likely to assert the insanity defense knowing that a
prison term may be of shorter duration than commitment to a mental health fa-
cility. See Steadman, supra note 51.
130. Under current law, clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness associated
with mental illness is construed to mean "evidence must be such that the court is
firm it its belief or conviction that the evidence shows the existence of the fact to
be proved." Hearing, supra note 22, at 16 (statement of Judge Merritt).
131. See Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, The Impact of Expanding a State's Ther-
apeutic Commitment Authority, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 45,
at 121 (discussing a 1979 amendment to Washington's civil commitment code
which expanded the definition of "gravely disabled"). The authors concluded
that increased government intervention, ostensibly for the purpose of providing
needed treatment, diminished the independence of mentally disabled individuals
and caused a shortage of treatment resources. Id.
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become a necessity for them rather than a prophylactic measure as it
was initially intended. In sum, empirical evidence on outpatient care
supports the notion that portions of LB 518 can facilitate attainment of
treatment objectives. The efficacy of the bill in achieving therapeutic
objectives depends on how it is construed and applied by the courts.
2. Graduated Release Programs
Graduated release programs are intended to minimize the occur-
rence of a cycle in which inpatients recover, enter into the community
where they decompensate, and return to an inpatient setting.'3 2
Under a graduated release format, individuals receive treatment cou-
pled with increasingly greater contact with the community. 33 The
programs enable mental health professionals to maintain frequent
contact with patients and to monitor patient interactions in the com-
munity.1 3 4 Some researchers have found that well-monitored release
programs with community follow-ups are associated with reductions
in violent behavior.i35 Thus, graduated release programs can facilitate
therapeutic objectives.
LB 518 incorporates the notion of a graduated release program into
its treatment provisions. 3 6 The bill gives the court authority to order
a less restrictive treatment program after review of the individual's
status, as long as the individual continues to be dangerous as a result
of mental illness.13 7 If the courts use LB 518 to order treatment en-
tailing increasingly greater community contact, 3 8 they will introduce
a kind of graduated release program into the system which may pro-
mote system efficiency 39 as well as therapeutic objectives.' 40 LB 518
132. This cycle is referred to as the "revolving door" problem. MAEDER, supra note
109, at 176; Stefan, supra note 82 at 295.
133. MAEDER, supra note 109, at 176 (describing the Clifton T. Perkins Center in
Maryland); See also Final Report, supra note 12, at 77 (evaluating the John How-
ard Pavilion (Forensic Division) of St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C.).
134. Final Report, supra note 12, at 98-99.
135. J. D. Bloom et al., Evaluation and Treatment of Insanity Acquittees in the Com-
munity, 14 BuL.. Au. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 231 (1986); J. L. Cavanaugh & 0.
E. Wasyliw, Treating the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Outpatient: A Two-
Year Study, 13 BuLL. Au. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 407 (1985); M.K. Spodak et al.,
Criminality of Discharged Insanity Acquittees: Fifteen Year Experience in
Maryland Reviewed, 12 BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 373 (1984).
136. LB 518 § 3(3).
137. LB 518 § 3(3).
138. LB 518 requires that during any period of time in which a court exercises control
over the acquittee, the individual must have a mental illness or defect which ren-
ders him a current or future danger.
139. Efficiency will result if graduated release programs do in fact minimize the "re-
volving door" problem.
140. The acquittees will be reintroduced into the community with treatment resources
at their disposal (i.e. day treatment, periodic checks, or other appropriate pro-
gram the court orders). Under existing Nebraska law, acquittees are inpatients
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has the capacity to promote therapeutic objectives; its ability to do so
will depend on the manner in which it is applied by the courts.
3. Reckless Endangerment Analogy
The purpose of reckless endangerment laws is to criminalize reck-
less conduct which is sufficiently dangerous to merit imposition of
punishment.141 In the context of omissions, a reckless endangerment
prosecution is proper as long as the omission was made by one who
had a duty to act.' 42 A duty to act can arise from court order,14 3 as
when an insanity acquittee is ordered to comply with treatment.
The concept of assigning some responsibility to a mentally disor-
dered offender is consonant with the idea that failure to do so can re-
tard treatment.144 Although LB 518 does not address reckless
endangerment, it does assign responsibility for maintenance of mental
health to the acquittee by enabling the court to consider the acquit-
tee's omissions in assessing dangerousness. 145 The bill makes failure
to comply with treatment or to take prescribed medication appropri-
ate evidence for the court to consider in assessing dangerousness.146
Through its inclusion of omissions as appropriate evidence of danger-
ousness, LB 518 ties the acquittee's conduct, or lack thereof, to his or
her treatment or confinement. It provides incentive for the acquittee
to take responsibility for his or her own mental health, much as reck-
less endangerment laws discourage people from failing to act when
they have a duty to do so. Thus, LB 518 aligns the interests of the
acquittee with those of society by encouraging the acquittee to take
personal interest in maintenance of his or her mental health.
C. TherapeuticCAspects of Legal Procedures
The legal process can promote therapeutic objectives by encourag-
ing greater attention to and familiarity with the condition of the indi-
vidual who is the focus of the legal proceeding.147 Some scholars
until they are no longer dangerous due to mental illness. They are released into
the community and are left to cope with the abrupt transition without the sup-
port of professional services.
141. David B. Wexler, Inducing Therapeutic Compliance through the Criminal Law,
in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 45, at 187.
142. Id. at 193 (discussing failure to take prescribed medication).
143. Id.
144. See Fein, supra note 54.
145. LB 518 §§ 1(1) & 2(1).
146. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
147. Of course, legal procedures can also hinder therapeutic objectives, as when they
are traumatic. See John J. Ensminger & Thomas D. Liguori, The Therapeutic
Significance of the Civil Commitment Hearing: An Unexplored potential, in
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 45, at 245, 246-47; Marc Amaya & W.V.
Burlingame, Judicial Review of Psychiatric Admissions: The Clinical Impact on
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assert that the use of outside experts in mental health proceedings
enhances the actual treatment provider's attention to and familiarity
with the patient in question. 48 They claim that the treatment pro-
vider's familiarity with the patient may be necessary to negate allega-
tions of inappropriate diagnosis or treatment.149 Additionally, the
chance that the treatment provider will be required to testify in court
may provide incentive for him or her to maintain meticulous records
and to be familiar with patient.15o These assertions would carry
greater weight if they were premised on empirical evidence.'51 How-
ever, their logic is sound, and such logic inheres in the provisions of
LB 518. If the prospect of testifying in court gives rise to meticulous
documentation and greater familiarity with the patient, LB 518 will
encourage familiarity and meticulous records. The bill will do so
through its requirement of court hearings in at least three stages of
the commitment process.152
If a person's contact with outside professionals encourages the
treatment provider to become more familiar with the individual's case,
LB 518 will serve this purpose as well. The bill enables the acquittee
to obtain a separate evaluation by one or more professionals of his or
her choice. 53 The bill requires the court to consider such evaluations
in conjunction with other relevant evidence. 54 In sum, the assertions
that evaluations by outsiders and the possibility of being called to tes-
tify in court will benefit the therapeutic process are in need of empiri-
cal validation. In the event that they are supportable through
research, the same research will provide support for the aspects of LB
518 which incorporate their logic.
D. Therapeutic Aspects of Judicial Behavior
Yet another way in which the legal system can promote therapeu-
tic objectives is to incorporate health care compliance principles into
its mechanisms and roles.155 There are several widely accepted princi-
Child and Adolescent Inpatients, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 45,
at 281, 285-89.
148. Ensminger & Liguori, supra note 147, at 17.
149. 1d
150. Id. at 20.
151. WEXLER, supra note 45, at 15.
152. LB 518 § l(1)(hearing to determine whether there is probable cause that the per-
son is or will be dangerous due to mental illness exists); § 2(1)(hearing to deter-
mine whether there ii clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness due to
mental illness); § 3(1)(annual review hearings and hearings on motions made by
the court, prosecutor, or person for whom treatment has been ordered).
153. LB 518 §§ 1(6) & 3(1).
154. LB 518 § 3(1).
155. David B. Wexler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee
Conditional Release Process, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE supra
note 45, at 199.
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ples that are particularly relevant to the role of a judge in ordering
treatment for an insanity acquittee. The judicial role must be analo-
gized to the role of a heath care professional in applying the principles.
Behaviors of the HCP that are associated with noncompliance among
patients include inadequate instruction on the treatment program,
preoccupation during contacts with patients, abruptness, maintaining
an air of superiority, and use of technical terms.156 This information
can be used by judges in ordering treatment for insanity acquittees
without offending judicial decorum.157 Specifically, judges can in-
crease treatment compliance by clearly delineating treatment pro-
grams for acquittees and by omitting legal or medical jargon from the
orders. Additionally, a judge can be attentive while the individual
states his or her story and can convey the message that the court is
motivated by the best interests of the acquittee under the circum-
stances at hand.
LB 518 erects no barriers to judicial behaviors which enhance
treatment compliance. Although the bill does not specifically require
such behaviors, it creates opportunities for them. 5 8 Thus, whether
the judiciary will implement LB 518 using behaviors that will promote
treatment compliance will be in the discretion of the courts.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF LB 518
LB 518 proposes to change the kind of evidence relevant to evaluat-
ing the dangerousness of a person acquitted of a crime by reason of
insanity. Additionally, it provides courts with the authority to order a
variety of treatment programs, including alternatives to the tradi-
tional inpatient care setting. LB 518 is a progressive attempt to har-
monize Nebraska law governing the disposition of insanity acquittees
with recent Supreme Court case law and modern treatment
information.
If it is enacted into law, LB 518 has enormous potential to achieve
this goal; however, the goals attainment is dependent on the manner
in which Nebraska courts apply the bill's provisions. If courts utilize
156. Id at 204, 213 (citing DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIs TURK, FACILITATING
TREATMENT ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER's GUIDEBOOK (1987)). Interestingly,
other researchers have identified similar behaviors of legal actors as correlates of
noncompliance with the law. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW (1990).
157. Wexler, supra note 155, at 212.
158. LB 518 §§ 1(4) & (5)(requiring that the individualized treatment plan include a
statement of the individual's needs and the factual predicates of the statement);
§ 1(6)(providing for a separate evaluation of the individual by a professional of
the individual's choice); § 2(2)(requiring the court to order appropriate treatment
and to specify conditions of liberty); § 3(1) (requiring annual review of the individ-
ual's status as well as review upon motion by the individual); and § 3(4)(providing
for a hearing on treatment compliance).
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their authority under the bill to order alternative treatment programs,
and if they continue to construe the clear and convincing standard in a
manner consistent with previous decisions, LB 518 will bring Ne-
braska law up to date with recent Supreme Court decisions and with
modern treatment information.
VI. CONCLUSION
LB 518 has great potential to facilitate therapeutic objectives. The
bill addresses, both directly and indirectly, a plethora of issues embod-
ied in the growing body of scholarship known as therapeutic jurispru-
dence. It reflects the wisdom of therapeutic jurisprudential logic, and
it provides courts with the opportunity implement mental health law
in a manner which is beneficial to the legal system and to the treat-
ment needs of acquitted individuals.
